Hybrid influencing tools

1. Propaganda

Diplomacy and war have always been aimed at influencing the thinking of political leaders and the people they lead. Propaganda aims to shape political discourse and popular narrative. Platforms created by digitalisation and social media can also be used for propaganda.

2. Media

The media are a traditional tool for spreading propaganda and desired news. State-sponsored media often aim to criticize opponents’ policies while praising their own initiatives. Stories are published on their sites in the hope that as many people as possible will read this distorted news and spread this disinformation. The sites are published either in English to reach English-speakers, or in various national languages to reach citizens living in those countries or abroad. This traditional tool is well known and continues to have the greatest effect, especially if such disinformation is disseminated further in the local media.

State-sponsored news agencies, such as Russia’s RT and Sputnik, publish both world and domestic news from the viewpoint of the State, and serve as a platform for spreading government ideas and preferences. For example, Sputnik helped the government defend Russia’s involvement in the Syrian civil war and criticised U.S. actions in the country. It constantly presents Russia’s involvement in a positive light, arguing that Russian aid has “prevented Syria from falling apart and has saved the Middle East from chaos.”

3. Social media

Social media offers governments a new way to access the mainstream media and influence the public. Social media can borrow news from domestic media or publish new information through state-sponsored accounts, bots or advertisements. This was a prominent feature of Russia’s hybrid warfare campaign in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Many Russian news stories, first published on RT or Sputnik, were then repeated and duplicated on Twitter (now known as “X”) or on Facebook via botnets and “trolls”. AI tools misused and spread false reports, which quickly become mainstream news.

The use of social media is very effective because many people read the news through it. A study conducted in the United States (2016) found that almost 70 percent of adults get their news through Twitter (now “X”) and Facebook, and for all those under the age of 50, the share was almost 80 percent.

Social media provides an opportunity to build a strong propaganda network that can be used to question objective truths or the content of domestic politics. This is particularly problematic because it has an incredible outreach. For example, during the 2016 US election campaign, Russian representatives spread distorted messages that reached up to 126 million Facebook users. Russian “troll networks” are very well organised. According to a study by The New York Times, in 2015, hundreds of Russians were working at a St. Petersburg “troll farm” (a kind of vertically integrated internet news supply chain) officially known as the Internet Research Agency (IRA).

4. Fakery and fake news

“Fake news” is a concept that was propagated during the 2016 U.S. election and includes both distortions of objective truths and misleading stories. The spread of fakery and fake news is possible on social media, as it usually does not check published posts and can be used to reach a wide audience. It is especially problematic if fake news can create a “trend” on social media or is also published in the mainstream media. The responsibility of social media for content has been much discussed. Facebook and Twitter (“X”) now acknowledge that they are no longer mere platforms without responsibility for content, but they do not yet admit to being publishers in the sense that they take responsibility for the accuracy of the information they transmit.

5. Strategic information leaks

Stolen information (documents, messages, images and videos) obtained through cyber and conventional espionage can be leaked to the public in order to influence public opinion and debate. The consequences of such leaks can be severe, from damaging operational security to undermining trust in the nation’s political system and state leadership. Leaks can be used to achieve political goals, and they have played an important role in Russian hybrid threat campaigns against foreign political processes, for example.

In the United States, the Russians have targeted political organisations and individuals, and have carried out strategically timed leaks to influence civil discourse and damage the democratic process. The Russians have also published stolen materials through Wikileaks and their own sponsored sites, Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks.com. During the French presidential election, the Russians leaked stolen information about Macron’s campaign just prior to the election.

6. Funding organisations

Many states fund organisations or think tanks that promote their views. Presenting ideas that promote the attractiveness of a country is one of the oldest tools for political and social influence. Russia and China have actively used this method to spread information from their perspectives to readers in the West. In 2015, for example, China funded the opening of a Chinese think tank in Washington called the Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS). Russia also supports several similar organisations in EU countries. In 2006, the Russian government established the so-called World Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots to coordinate the communications of Russian organisations abroad. A Kremlin think tank known as the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS) has offices in the Baltic States and has been suspected of trying to prevent Montenegro from joining NATO, influencing elections in Bulgaria, and blocking Sweden’s efforts to strengthen ties with NATO countries.

Such institutions provide a means for donor countries to disseminate their ideas and views, as they can participate in the political debate in their target countries. Many of their governing bodies include influential politicians or other figures close to the leadership of the donor countries.

7. Influencing political parties, including through funding

Some countries also seek to influence foreign countries through the political parties with which they have close ties or which they fund, because such parties promote the interests and goals of the funding country. For example, Russians are suspected of funding political parties in many countries in the former Soviet Union’s orbit. Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Front in France has reportedly received loans for its operations from Russian banks. The parties supported in this way can represent the whole political spectrum and do not necessarily have formal agreements with the Russians. Ideological considerations are less important than their ability to help the foreign finance providers (e.g. the Russians).

8. Organised protest and separatist movements

Hybrid influencing can also be used to establish and support protest or separatist movements. Russia used this tool in 2016, for example, to support anti-EU groups in the Dutch referendum on trade with Ukraine. In Bulgaria, too, the information campaign organised by the anti-shale gas demonstration movement is suspected of having been funded by the Russians.

9. Influential persons (e.g. Russian oligarchs, mafia, etc.)

An important means of influencing is contact with compatriots living and working abroad who have ties to political, business, media or commercial organisations, and even organised crime. These people act as agents, maintaining close relationships with local communities and, where necessary, acting as influencers in their respective fields and, ultimately, in political processes. Such persons and the companies they own may have a significant impact on the respective economies and societies of the target countries in general. For example, significant investments have been made in the Greek economy by a Russian-Greek businessman who is a member of the Russian Parliament and the United Russia party.

10. Religious denominations

Religion and different religions have always played, and continue to play, an important role in the political structure of many countries. This is central in Muslim countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. In Turkey, too, the importance of religion in political activity is increasing. In many countries of the Far East, religions have a great influence. The Russian state and the country’s Orthodox Church have similar foreign policy goals. In 2003, a working group composed of senior members of the Russian Orthodox Church and leading Russian politicians was established to facilitate cooperation on foreign policy initiatives. The Orthodox Church has played an important role in establishing contacts between Greece and Russia. In Greece, the far-right Golden Dawn party has repeatedly referred to the religious ties between Greeks and Russians that make them natural and historical allies.

11. Cyber tools and networks

More on this in the next chapter (link).

12. Economic influence (sanctions, loans, donations, development aid, etc.)

The means of economic influence may include the use of foreign aid and other resources to put pressure on the government of the target country. This tool is not new, but it remains one of the most important and effective tools for influencing decision-making in another country. Economic influence is not limited to sanctions and trade, but also includes other sectors such as energy and tourism. The United States has long relied on the use of economic sanctions to influence the policies and actions of foreign countries – and these have been developed for greater and more specific influence by applying them directly to certain individuals, for example.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action against Iran is proof of the effectiveness of economic means. The sanctions imposed by the US, the EU and the UN affected the Iranian economy in such a way that Iran agreed to the demanded nuclear obligations in exchange for lifting nuclear sanctions. Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine, which began as early as the 2010s or even earlier, also used economic means to pressure Ukraine’s leadership not to integrate with the EU. Russia used cheap natural gas and loans to pressure President Yanukovych to abandon negotiations on an EU-Ukraine association agreement.

China also uses economic power as a means of influencing international politics. It has sought to punish South Korea with the aim of countering the deployment of the US THAAD missile defence system. Beijing reduced Chinese travel to South Korea, banned concerts by Korean music band K-Pop in China and censored South Korean television, while Chinese companies boycotted South Korean brands and goods. Although these sanctions were “unofficial,” they led South Korea to agree to military restrictions in exchange for the lifting of Chinese sanctions.

The effectiveness of economic means of influence depends on the vulnerabilities of the target country’s economy.  North Korea, for example, is not so vulnerable to economic sanctions because it is such a small part of the global economy. Iran’s economy is more tied to the international economy, which is why sanctions have been effective. Similarly, Ukraine’s dependence on Russian natural gas and debts to Russia made Ukraine very vulnerable to Russian sanctions.

Economic means of influence cost a lot to the party applying them, which is why other tools, such as disinformation, cyberbullying, and political pressures, are often more attractive tools for influencing. They have greater potential to influence the policy of the target country at a much lower price than is the case with economic investment or military action.

13. Proxies, mercenaries, and proxy warfare

The use of proxy actors and unrecognized conflicts as a means of influence is a very old and well-established tactic. During the Cold War, the Americans and Russians took care that their forces never clashed with each other, and therefore most of the conflict between these countries was played out through proxy actors – mainly in Africa and Central America. In recent years, the importance of various companies that provide military services (such as Blackwater, Wagner, etc.) and the use of foreign fighters (mercenaries) has also increased. They are used not only by the United States and Russia, but also by other militarily strong countries.

Proxy actors may take the form of states and paramilitary organisations, political parties or insurgent movements and separatist groups, as well as mercenaries who are financially and militarily supported, have suitable views, or whose own interests coincide with those of a foreign state. Vicarious actors can also be used to gather information and exert political influence in a foreign country.

Russia has funded and equipped paramilitary organisations to advance its interests on its periphery. The most active has been the Night Wolves motorcycle club, which is an ultra-nationalist group with close ties to the Russian leadership. During the Crimean crisis, members of the group who were operating in the region claimed to have held a free and fair referendum and to have helped the local population in the fight against the local fascists. A paramilitary group in Ukraine’s Donetsk region (the Russian Orthodox Army) has openly defended extreme nationalism and opposed Western influence in the region. The group has been trained in reconnaissance, defence and sniper missions.

In many countries, special forces are part of the armed forces, intelligence services or security services. They, too, often act in secret, for example by covering their faces and not wearing military insignia. Such action allows the state to deny their role and existence, which undermines the target country’s ability to react, as they have no verifiable information about the contribution of these special forces.

An unacknowledged proxy war is almost always associated with the use of proxy actors. Vicarious actors are not recognised, but their involvement is an “open secret”. In the 1980s, U.S. support for those fighting against the communist regime in Nicaragua as well for the Mujahedin guerrillas fighting Soviet occupation in Afghanistan are examples of this tactic.  When the United States did not acknowledge its contribution, diplomatic relations could be maintained as if no secret support had taken place. Russian “little green men” in Crimea in 2014 and the so-called “separatists” in eastern Ukraine belong to this same feature, although Russia has tried to maintain the illusion that those are actors independent of Russia.