Hybrid influencing as part of security and defence policy

Hybrid threats and hybrid influencing

  • Not a new phenomenon: always using propaganda, political and economic influence, deceiving the opponent with covert operations, breaking agreements, etc.
  • What’s new: simultaneous and complementary use of multiple means of influence
  • Activity remains below detection and response threshold
  • Capitalises on the speed and usability of digital technology
  • The ability to operate in information networks (cyber environment) has brought new tools and opportunities
  • Widespread use by state and non-state actors
  • A key part of the non-military toolbox for wide-ranging influencing

In addition to its complementarity, another feature of hybrid warfare is the strategic use of its means of influence, both vertically and horizontally. Such means of influence are targeted at the vulnerabilities of another state and exploit them. When several different means of influence are used asymmetrically, the action escalates both horizontally and vertically. Several tools (horizontal escalation) are used to achieve a greater composite effect. Escalation with a single tool (vertical) enhances the effects, if necessary. These means are used to achieve certain objectives and may also change as the campaign progresses.

Synchronised vertical and horizontal escalation in the use of hybrid influencing methods. Image source: Multinational Capability Development Project: Countering Hybrid Warfare (Understanding Hybrid Warfare & Countering Hybrid Warfare)

National and multinational government organisations:

The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE):
https://www.hybridcoe.fi/

  • an independent, web-based international organisation in Helsinki. Acting in close cooperation with the EU and NATO, Hybrid CoE improves the capabilities of the 33 participating states to counter hybrid threats. The Centre focuses on different aspects of hybrid threats – ranging from soft means to military means, and from politics to practical issues. The first nine participating states, together with NATO and the EU, established the Centre in Helsinki in 2017.

European Union Institute for Strategic Studies (EUISS):
https://www.iss.europa.eu/)

  • The EU Agency for Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Analysis in Paris. Its core task is to assist the EU and the Member States in implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). EUISS was set up in 2002 to strengthen the EU’s capacity to analyse, foresee and network external action. It also acts as an interface between the EU institutions and external experts, including security actors, with the goal of developing EU strategic thinking.

The State Security Department of Lithuania:
https://www.vsd.lt/en/threats/threats-national-security-lithuania/

  • Every year, the Second Department of Operational Services under the Ministry of State Security, the Intelligence Services and the Ministry of Defence of Lithuania publish a joint public assessment of threats to national security.

US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA):
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/

  • The United States Agency for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security. CISA is the Federal Chief Cybersecurity Operations Officer and the National Coordinator for Security and Resilience of Critical Infrastructure. Its mission is to guide national efforts aimed at understanding, managing and mitigating risks to U.S. cyber and physical infrastructure.